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NONPREFERENTIAL AID TO RELIGION IS NOT AN
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
JAmE~S M. 0O'N~rur
I
THE LANGUAGE OF THE ESTABLISHIMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
" This phraseology was designed to meet the wishes of the
people of various states who had adopted resolutions, memorials,
and petitions, recommending that the Federal Constitution should
make clear that "no particular sect or society ought to be favored
or established by law in preference to others."
Virginia voted in June, 1788, "no particular religious sect or
society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to
others"; New York, July, 1788, used the same language except
that "particular" was omitted; North Carolina, November 1788,
used the same words as Virginia; Rhode Island, in ratifying the
Constitution "declared" certain principles, one of which was
(with slight variations) identical with the Virginia declaration.
Other states used language consistent with the above, but they
did not mention public funds to aid religion, government co-
operation with religion, religious education, or religion in educa-
tion. Public education was, of course, not mentioned as it was
substantially unknown until many years later.
'When the Revolutionary War broke out, there were nine es-
tablished Protestant churches in nine of the colonies.1 By the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted, four of these establishments had
been eliminated and five were still in existence. The last of these
established Protestant churches disappeared in New England
when the Congregational Church lost its favored position among
religious groups in Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in
1827, and in Massachusetts in 1833. The First Amendment was
neither for nor against these state establishments of religion.2 It
simply left "an establishment of religion" for any state where it
was left by the original Constitution-in the hands of the people
of the states. But since Congress could "make no law respect-
ing [i. e., concerning or about] an establishment of religion"
there could be none set up by the Congress for the United States as
a whole.
1. SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGIONS Ix AmEICA 274 (1st ed. 1930).
2. O'NEmu, RELGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTrrUTION C. 3 (1949).
THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Alexander Hamilton and some others had taken the position
that there should not be a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. They
argued that since the federal government was a government of
enumerated powers, and since no power had been given to the
federal government to deal with such matters, a Bill of Rights
was unnecessary." Thomas Jefferson, who was our minister to
Paris at the time, wrote to James Madison that he agreed that
Congress had no power to deal with such matters, but he said he
wanted a "text" in the Constitution by which to try "the acts
of the federal government" if it attempted to interfere in these
concerns of the people of the various states.4 Madison agreed
with Hamilton and Jefferson that a Bill of Rights in the Consti-
tution was not necessary, but he "favored it" because he sup-
posed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be
of "disservice. ' 5
It was Madison who carefully phrased a Bill of Rights, and
submitted it to the First Congress of the United States. His
original wording of the establishment clause was "nor shall any
national religion be established." This was referred to a com-
mittee (of which Madison was a member) which recommended
the language "no religion shall be established by law." This
clear purpose of making explicit what was implicit in the original
Constitution, viz., that the Congress could not grant governmental
favor to one religion over all other religions, ran all through
the deliberations of the First Congress. It was finally accom-
plished by recording in the establishment clause that Congress
could not touch the subject-could make no law at all, either for
or against, an establishment of religion.
It is important to note that the authors of the Bill of .Rights
"took sides" in regard to freedom* of religion, freedom of the
press, freedom of speech, and of assembly. They did not say that
Congress could not legislate on these subjects, but that Congress
could make no law that prohibited or abridged these basic free-
doms. But the authors of the First Amendment did not "take
sides" in regard to "an establishment of religion." In other
words, the phrasing of the First Amendment dealing with an
establishment of religion is different from that dealing with free-
dom of religion. In the writings of Jefferson and Madison, in the
language of the Congress at various times, and in Supreme Court
decisions, the concept of an establishment of religion has regularly
been differentiated from the concept of freedom of religion.
3. COOLEY, CoNSmONAL LiMrrATIoNS 313-314 (1883).
4. PAnvE, THE CO imm J msoN 124 (1943).
5. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (Hunt ed. 1904).
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. There doubtless would be general agreement that the two
concepts are related, but that there could be an establishment of
religion with almost as much freedom of religion as is ever possible
-since absolute freedom of religion (and of speech and press)
has never been allowed in any country. In England, for instance,
where the Anglican Church is established, there is substantially
as much freedom of religion as there is in the United States where
we have no establishment of religion. Obviously, the free exercise
of religion can be interfered with in countries in which there is no
establishment of religion.
THE CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In spite of the fact that no American wants an establishment
of 'religion today, the meaning of the establishment clause has
taken a place of unusual prominence in recent years. It has been
the real (though often largely ignored) issue in certain key contro-
versies which have reached the United States Supreme Court in
the last decade. It was the issue in the Everson bus case,' in which
the United States Supreme Court decided that using public funds
to provide bus transportation for children attending Catholic
parochial schools in New Jersey did not constitute " an establish-
rent of religion," and therefore did not violate the Constitution
of the United States. It was the issue in the McCollum case,7 in
which the Supreme Court decided that permitting voluntary
religious education, in public school buildings, without expense to
the taxpayers in Champaign, Illinois, taught by members of various
,religious groups -for certain children, at the written request of
their parents, and available on equal terms to all religious groups,
did constitute an establishment of religion. In this case the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court largely ignored the language of the
Constitution and gave substantially no justification for taking the
position that the released time program in Champaign, Illinois,
constituted an establishment of religion. They simply proclaimed
it. The establishment clause was also the issue in the Zorach
case,8 in which the Supreme Court decided that the released time
system in New York City, which differed from the Champaign
situation only in the fact that the school children left the school
buildings to go elsewhere during school hours to receive religious
6. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
7. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
8. Zorach v. Clairson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
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instruction, did not constitute an establishment of religion. The
Court took this position despite the fact that in the McColum
case the only reference to the use of school buildings being an
expense on the taxpayer was dismissed as so infinitesimal as to
be irrelevant.
.In all of these cases the Justices of the Supreme Court
substantially avoided any discussion of the meaning of the lan-
guage of the Constitution which was before them for interpretation
and application. They chose, instead, to talk about the superla-
tively ambiguous phrase "the separation of Church and state."
This phrase, on account of its ambiguity, never can have a specific
meaning anywhere unless the specificity is furnished by the
context. Since the phrase does not appear in the Constitution of
the United States (nor in the Constitution of any state in the
Union), it has no constitutional context and therefore cannot
possibly have any ascertainable constitutional meaning. The
Court, however, in these cases paid considerable attention to a
figure of speech taken from the polite correspondence of Thomas
Jefferson, viz: "A wall of separation between Church and state."
This metaphor has obviously the weakness of all figurative lan-
guage: it is figurative and not literal. Being figurative it can
necessarily have various interpretations and applications, but it
can never anywhere have the kind of literal, specific meaning that
should always and everywhere characterize the language of con-
stitutions, laws, contracts, and judicial decisions.
THE SCOPE OF THE CONTROVERSY
As indicated previously, the distinction between freedom. of
religion and establishment of religion must be kept in mind in any
fundamental discussion, although both concepts might be inter-
mingled in a limited and specific controversy. We are not here
discussing the clause about the free exercise of religion. This
discussion is concerned only with the meaning of the establishment
clause, and specifically with the question whether or not it forbids
non-preferential government assistance to religion. Nor are we
here concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom of any governmental
policy, past, present, or future. Also irrelevant to this discussion
are religious doctrines and beliefs, and the propriety of any acts
or policies of any religious official or organization. We are debat-
ing simply the meaning of certain language which was adopted
as part of the Constitution in 1791: on such a question there can
be no religious doctrine or position. Finally, Dr. Pfeffer and I
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are not here concerned with the desirability or practicability of
any of the various kinds of separation of Church and state;
specifically, we are not debating the merits of the type of relation
between religion and government which is expressed in the Consti-
tution of the United States. So far as I know, all Americans, of
every creed, and every party, believe in our American constitu-
tional type of separation of Church and state. If Dr. Pfeffer and
I disagree on this matter, it is because he does not subscribe to our
American doctrine. I do.
The issue in this discussion is: "Does the establishment
clause mean that Congress can make no law on the subject of
non-preferential assistance of government to religion?" Or still
more specifically, does an "establishment of religion" mean any
(even non-preferential) assistance to religion? My answer is
"no." The words "an establishment of religion", interpreted in
the light of their history, cannot properly be held to mean "any,
even non-preferential, assistance to religion."
We must find the answer to our issue by the method of inter-
pretation in the light of history. This is the only scholarly way
to find the meaning of any language in any historical document
when the meaning is in doubt. In order to follow this method, we
must survey two areas. One is the purpose of the language as
used by the men who wrote, adopted, and ratified it. The purpose
of any language which has a purpose, used anywhere by anyone,
has to exist in the mind of the person or persons using the
language. Intent, purpose, can exist nowhere else. It is not to
be found in the black marks on the printed paper, nor in the prefer-
ences of readers of the language, but in the human mind which
selects and uses the language. Jefferson wrote that the Constitu-
tion should be construed by the Supreme Court,
. according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its
language to the common intendment of the time, and of those
who framed it. On every question of construction, [we must]
carry ourselves back to the time when the constitution was adopt-
ed, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of
trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or in-
vented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was
passed. It should be left to the sophisms of advocates, whose
trade it is, to prove . . . that a power has'been given because
it ought to have been given.9
Justice Frankfurter, to take a modern example, made a
comment that should be heeded by those who seek to find in the
9. The Usurpation of the Supreme, Court, in a letter to William Johnson, June
12, 1823. PAwvOE, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 322-323.
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establishment clause various explicit meanings which are not
covered by the language or the clear purpose of the authors of
this clause. "It would be extraordinarily strange," he says, "for
a Constitution to convey such specific commands in such a round-
about and inexplicit way. After all, an amendment to the
Constitution should be read in a ' sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption.' . . . For it was for
public adoption that it was proposed."'"
Our first task, therefore, is to find out what the phrase, "an
establishment of religion" meant to eighteenth century Americans
in general, and specifically what it meant to men like Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, and the men of the First Congress, who
were responsible for the language of the Bill of Rights. Our
second area of investigation is a survey of the application and
interpretation of the establishment clause by those who were in
positions of responsibility in regard to its interpretation or appli-
cation beginning with its ratification in 1791, and following down
through its history. An investigation of both of these areas
demonstrates that the attempt to ascribe to the establishment
clause the meaning of a prohibition of non-preferential assistance
by government to religion is a modern invention which has no
basis in language, tradition, law or history.
IV
NONPREFERENTIAL AID IS NO ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION
A. The Language of the Clause. The language was designed
simply to express (not to create) the constitutional arrangement
which left legislative action concerning an establishment of religion
in the hands of the several states. The language, as shown above,
only made explicit what was implicit in the existing situation, i. e.,
Congress could not legislate either for or against an establishment
of religion.
B. The Record of Jefferson's Words and Actions. While
Thomas Jefferson was not a member of the First Congress, his
relationship to the movement against the establishment of any
religion in this country is so important that a careful discussion
of this problem cannot omit consideration of Jefferson's actions
and statements. Jefferson touched many times upon some aspect
of the relation of government to religion, and it is so important as
to be almost conclusive that no scholar has so far ever cited a
10. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
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single, clear, specific statement from Thomas Jefferson in opposi-
tion to all, even non-preferential, government aid to religion.
It is clear beyond question that Jefferson was opposed to an
establishment of religion in Virginia by the government in
Virginia, or in the United States as a whole by the government
of the United States. There is no question about that, and today,
as far as I know, all Americans agree. As an opponent of an
establishment of religion, Jefferson was necessarily opposed to
financial governmental favor to the established religion which was
not available to other religions: Such exclusive favor is a universal
aspect of establishments of religion, as the Catholic in Spain, the
Anglican in England, the Presbyterian in Scotland, the Lutheran
in Sweden, and the Jewish in Israel.
The passages from Jefferson, which propagandists frequently
use in order to promote the idea that Jefferson was opposed to
any government aid to religion, are principally his Bill for
Religious Freedom in Virginia (1786), and his letter to the
Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut (1802).
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom in Virginia, passed in
1786, is to most Americans a persuasive document. Its legitimate
use is above adverse criticism. However, the attempt to get from
it any support for the thesis that the First Amendment means,
or was designed to mean, a complete separation of church and
state in America, or specifically a prohibition of the use of public
funds in impartial support of religion, does violence to Jefferson's
language in this bill and to his whole record. There is not a word
in the bill that warrants the claim that Jefferson was opposed to
impartial government aid to religion.
The inference that what any man advocated as state law he
would necessarily believe in as a provision of the Federal Consti-
tution, or as a national law, is obviously bad. Any man, regard-
less of his personal theory of state-federal relationships, could
believe a law good for Virginia and not want it as a constitutional
provision binding on all of the several states. When the man in
question hapgens to be Thomas Jefferson, who all his life drew
the sharpest line between the federal government and the author-
ity of the states, and who insisted that each state was sovereign in
all matters of domestic concern, such an inference becomes wholly
ridiculous.
The whole Bill is expressed in one sentence. It "enacts"
four things: In Virginia no man shall (1) be compelled by the
government to attend or support any religious worship, place, or
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ministry whatsoever, nor (2) be punished or interfered with by
the government on account of his religious opinions or beliefs, but
(on the contrary) every man shall be free (so far as the govern-
ment is concerned) (3) to profess and argue for his religious
opinions and beliefs, and (4) such activity shall in no way affect
his civil capacities.
Note that this law is concerned primarily with prohibiting
state laws in regard to opinion, belief, and worship, as these
matters were universally covered in laws setting up an "establish-
ment of religion." The Virginia statute has no clear reference
of any kind to public money, sectarian schools, religion in educa-
tion, or the complete separation of church and state.
Not only do these four provisions of the Virginia law deal
with the almost invariable features of "an establishment," but
the long preamble deals also with theories and practices of
churches "established" by governments which make government
officials the judges of the validity of religious opinions and make
civil rights dependent upon religious belief. In this context the
first clause of the law could certainly mean that no man shall be
compelled to attend or support any religion whatsoever that is
selected for his attendance and support by the government. This
is also the burden of the preamble. This is the meaning that best
harmonizes with the context of the bill itself, the context of the
times, and Jefferson's whole record.
Jefferson's figure of speech, "a wall of separation between
church and state," is probably more often misused in the modern
attack on the First Amendment than any other phrase in his
writings. The present Justices of the Supreme Court are strangely
addicted to trying to substitute this phrase for the first clause
of the First Amendment. No one should assume that Jefferson
was unaware of the difference in authority between Congress and
the state legislatures. Anyone who knows Jefferson's history and
writing knows that Jefferson was fully aware of the constitutional.
separation of powers between the federal and state governments.
Jefferson, therefore, necessarily knew that the First Amendment
was not intended to have any effect whatever on any regulations
of any kind, anywhere, covering the relations of any government
agency to religion or religious education except a nationally
created, exclusively favored position for one religion as against
all other religions.
Jefferson did use the phrase "a wall of separation between
church and state." He used this figure of speech in a reply which
he made as President of the United States to an address of con-
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gratulation and good wishes by a committee representing the
Danbury, Connecticut, Baptist Association on January 1, 1802.
The whole sentence from which this figurative fragment has been
taken is absolute proof that President Jefferson could not have
been thinking of a wall of any kind, high or low, pregnable or
impregnable; which had any relation whatever to most of the
matters mentioned in the elaborate rewriting of the first clause
of the First Amendment in Justice Black's dictum in the Everson
case."
Jefferson's long sentence which included the famous figure of
speech, spoke of the First Amendment as "that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between church and state." His next sentence was: "Adhering
to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see," etc. The rights of conscience
may be endangered by established churches, but are never en-
dangered by treating all religions equally in regard to support,
or nonsupport, by a government that allows religious freedom.
Jefferson could have been thinking of the wall separating church
and state only in regard to matters which were under the authority
of the Congress at that time or were mentioned in the Amendment
itself. Such matters did not include authority over religious af-
fairs, education, the relation of religion to education, public sup-
port of either, or safety and health provisions for children. Gov-
ernment authority over all such matters, except any laws about a
nationally established religion and national restrictions on re-
ligious freedom, was, and remained, exclusively and unambiguously
the responsibility of the individual states. Jefferson's metaphor
could have no reference at all to these matters.
Jefferson was President of the United States for eight years.
Throughout his administration the United States government used
federal funds in aid of religion in various ways with no protest
from President Jefferson, no recommendation to Congress for
constitutional or statutory change, no action by him as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States Army or Navy to prohibit
the use of government funds for religious activity in the armed
forces. It seems clearly impossible for anyone to believe that
Thomas Jefferson thought that the First Amendment prohibited
even non-preferential government aid to religion without believ-
11. "The 'establishment of religion' clause in the First Amendment means atleast this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another." Everson v. Board of Education, supra n. 6 at 15.
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ing that Jefferson lacked sufficient integrity to live up to his oath
of office as President of the United States. He either had to be-.
lieve that such aid was constitutional, or else he had to disregard
his oath of office-one or the other.
Further, Thomas Jefferson was a leading citizen of Virginia
for forty years after the adoption of his Bill for Religious Freedom,
and for thirty-five years after his letter to the Baptists of Dan-
bury. During all that time, and, as a matter of fact, right up to
today, the State of Virginia has been rather outstanding in its
use of government funds in non-preferential aid to religion.12
Neither Mr. Pfeffer nor any of his colleagues have ever produced
any evidence that Thomas Jefferson ever so much as uttered the
slightest protest against these practices of the State of Virginia.
The argument has frequently been made as follows: (1) Jef-
ferson's Bill for Religious Freedom made all government aid to
religion illegal in Virginia. (2) The First Amendment must have
meant what the Bill for Religious Freedom meant. Therefore,
(3) the First Amendment prohibits all government aid to religion.
This argument necessarily overlooks the facts that (a) the lan-
guage was different; (b) the authorship was different (Jefferson
was not a member of the First Congress); (c) one was a state law,
the other a United States constitutional provision; (d) state and
federal governments are different in form and in function; (e)
Jefferson was the most ardent advocate of observing and main-
taining these differences (the doctrine of states' rights) in his
time-if not actually in all American history. This whole argu-
ment is worthless, of course, since the Bill for Religious Freedom
did not (as we have seen) prohibit impartial government aid to
religion. But even if it did, the assumption that the First Amend-
ment must mean what Virginia's law meant, is invalid as infer-
ence.
Jefferson's most specific statement in regard to the relation
of government to religion is in his statement concerning the Free-
dom of Religion in the University of Virginia.3 Jefferson, of
course, was for freedom of religion (as Dr. Pfeffer is, and I am,
and most Americans of our day). Jefferson was opposed to an
establishment of religion, as we all are today. But neither of
these positions indicated that he thought that government should
not assist religion so long as it did not prefer one religion over
all other religions. He wrote:
In the same report of the commissioners of 1818 it was stated
by them that in conformity with the principles of constitution,
12. O'N=i, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 146, 175-177.
13. Yd. at 284-285.
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which, place all sects of religion on an equal footing, with the
jealousies of the different sects in guarding that equality from
encroachment or surprise, and with the sentiments of the legisla-
ture in freedom of religion, manifested on former occasion they
had not proposed that any professorship of divinity should be es-
tablished in the University; . . . It was not, however, to be
understood that instruction in religious opinion and duties was
meant to be precluded by the public authorities, as indifferent to
the interests of society. On the contrary, the relations which
exist between man and his Maker, and the duties resulting from
those relations, are the most interesting and important to every
human being, and the most incumbent on his study and investi-
gation. The want of instruction in the various creeds of religious
faith existing among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in
a general institution of the useful sciences. But it was thought
that this want, and the entrustment to each society of instruction
in its own doctrine, were evils of less danger than a permission
to the public authorities to dictate modes or principles of reli-
gious instruction, or than opportunities furnished them by giving
countenance or ascendancy to any one sect over another. A rem-
edy, however, has been suggested of promising aspect, which,
while it excludes the public authorities from the domain of reli-
gious freedom, will give to the sectarian schools of divinity the
full benefit of the public provisions made for instruction in the
other branches of science. [Italics supplied.]
C. The Record of Madison. James Madison's record on this
matter almost exactly parallels Jefferson's. Like Jefferson, Madi-
son never made a clear, explicit statement that he was opposed to
any and all (even non-preferential) aid to religion by government.
No current attempt to use Madison as a ground for the Rutledge
doctrine, which is Dr. Pfeffer's position, has ever cited such a
statement. Clearly, that was not his purpose in the First Amend-
ment, as shown above. Anyone familiar with the history of the
time, anyone who has read the Annals of the First Congress, must
admit that the one man who had most to do with the phraseology
of the First Amendment was James Madison. Anyone who has
read the comments of scholars, biographers, and historians, on
James Madison, and who has read a half-dozen paragraphs of
Madison's clear, meticulously worded, and often brilliant prose,
will doubtless agree that James Madison's ability to express his
thought in the English language was outstanding, and that his
ability accurately to phrase political documents, constitutions, and
laws was unusual and unquestioned. Therefore, it seems pertinent
to ask why, when anyone wants to know what James Madison's
purpose was in the First Amendment, he does not consider and
accept the language of James Madison in the Amendment itself,
and what Madison said about the purpose of the Amendment in
the Annals of the First Congress. Insofar as Justice Rutledge
252
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went to these sources at all-and he did refer to them here and
there-he refused to accept the language of the Amendment, and
he omitted to quote Madison's most illuminating passages in re-
gard to its meaning. He gave us Eckenrode's interpretation of
something that Madison wrote about some other subject, in trying
to arrive at what Madison meant in the First Amendment, but he
did not quote Madison himself.'
4
Madison's position on the First Amendment can be found in
any good library- in his letter to Thomas Jefferson in October,
1788,15 in his private notes on his speech on the First Amendment
in the First Congress,' 6 and in the Annals of the First Congress.
All these statements are consistent and all of them deny the posi-
tion taken by Dr. Pfeffer in this discussion.
On June 8, 1789, Madison in the First Congress spoke clearly
on the meaning of the establishment clause. After his original
wording "nor shall any national religion be established," had been
changed to "no religion shall be established by law," Madison
said that
. . he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience. Whether the words are
necessary or not he did not mean to say, but they had been re-
quired by some of the State Conventions who seemed to fear that
Congress might make laws of such a nature as might infringe
the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to
prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended,
and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language
would admit.'1
In his Detached Memoranda,8 date unknown, but some time
after he had retired from the Presidency in 1817, Madison wrote:
"They [the people of the United States] have the noble merit of
first unshackling, the conscience from persecuting laws, and of es-
tablishing among religious sects a legal equality." [Italics sup-
plied.]
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance9 has been frequently
misrepresented as an argument against any government aid to
religion. Justice Rutledge characterized it as ".a broadside at-
14. Id. at 60.
15. HUNT, op. cit. supra n. S at 269.
16. Id. at 380.
17. 1 ANNALS oF CoNamass 729-731 (Benton ed. 1858).
18. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 Wiu..i- AND MARY QuARTMRY
534-568 (1946).
19. O'NEnL, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 278-283.
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tack upon all forms of 'establishment' of religion, both general
and particular, nondiscriminatory or selective." This is like
referring to a general, nondiscriminatory monopoly granted to all
automobile manufacturers. There has never been a general, non-
discriminatory "establishment of religion," recognized as such
in any nation in history. Justice Rutledge also said that the Bill
Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion
was "nothing more nor less than a taxing measure for the sup-
port of religion." This is obviously not true, as anyone can see
by reading the Bill or Madison's argument against it. (See quota-
tion below.)
Anyone who believes that a general nondiscriminatory aid to
religion constitutes "Ian establishment of religion" not only finds
himself out of step with centuries of scholarship and of religious
and political history, Catholic and Protestant, European and
American, but he must believe, if well informed, that we have had
"an establishment of religion" in the United States and in all of
the states in the Union throughout our history. All have given
nondiscriminatory aid to religion in various ways.21
In order to believe that Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance was an argument against any, even impartial government
aid to religion, one has to ignore the most pregnant passage in
this great document. Here Madison states clearly his under-
standing that the bill he was fighting was an attempt to "establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions." This was ex-
plicitly stated in the language and title of the bill, "A Bill Estab-
lishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion."
Madison wrote:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion
of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to
any other establishment in all cases whatsoever? [Italics sup-
plied.]
In his Memorial and Remonstrance Madison presented fifteen
numbered reasons "against said bill" for establishing Christian-
ity in Virginia. Not one of the fifteen concerns general financial
support of religion. Madison objects only to the state forcing "a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the sup-
port of any one establishment."
20. Rutledge, J., dissenting in Everson v. Board of Education, supra n. 6 at 37.
21. O'N=ni, op. cit. supra a. 2, c. 9.
THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Dr. Pfeffer follows Justice Rutledge in the "general, nondis-
criminatory" theory. He writes2 of the Memorial and Remon-
strance as in "opposition to a general appropriation bill in Vir-
ginia for the support of religion." Clearly, as I have just shown,
that was not Madison's idea of what he was fighting. Nor was it
Jefferson's. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is generally
credited with killing the bill to establish Christianity (instead of
the Anglican Church) as the government favored religion in Vir-
ginia. This opened the way for the positive provisions of Jeffer-
son's Bill for Religious Freedom in Virginia. This Jefferson
wrote2" was "meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its pro-
tection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan,
the Hindoo and the Infidel of every denomination."
Madison was also President of the United States for eight
years, and throughout his administration, the United States gov-
ernment used federal funds in various ways in aid of religion on
a non-preferential basis; including chaplains in both houses of
Congress and in the Army and Navy, money to missionaries to
pay them for "teaching the great duties of religion and morality
to the Indians. ' 24 Madison also was a leading citizen of Virginia
for fifty years after the passage of the Virginia Bill for Religious
Freedom, and for forty-five years after the Bill of Rights became
part of the Constitution. I have never seen any evidence that
Madison ever uttered the slightest criticism of the fact that Vir-
ginia was using public supported personnel and facilities in aid
of religion throughout his lifetime. So he could not have believed
that Jefferson's bill made illegal government aid to religion "in
any guise, form or degree."
As in Jefferson's case, there were certain passages which
Madison wrote (as shown above), which have been, from time to
time, inaccurately used in an effort to bolster up the idea that
Madison was opposed to any kind of government aid to religion.
And again, as in Jefferson's case, no one has ever attempted to
resolve the dilemma as to whether Madison, as President of the
United States, was ignorant of the meaning of the First Amend-
ment, or was lacking in sufficient integrity to live up to his oath
of office to support the Constitution. The chief passages from
Madison, in addition to the Memorial and Remonstrance, which
are sometimes used in order to promote the idea that he had,
despite his lifetime record, been opposed to any government aid
to religion, are two brief veto messages, 5 and a passage in his
detached memoranda.
22. Church and State: Something Less Than Separation, 47 LmRTrY, A MAGAZINE
oF RELIGIOUS FREEDOm 36 (1952).
23. PADoVER, op. cit. sgpra n. 4 at 1147.
24. 4 AumCAx STATE PAERS 54, 66 (Lowrie and Clark ed. 1932).
25. 1 RiCHAEDSON, MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 467 (1908).
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The veto messages are these: The first, signed February 21,
1811, said: "An act incorporating the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia.
The bill enacts into and establishes by law sundry rules and pro-
ceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the
church incorporated . . . This particular church, therefore,
would so far be a religious establishment by law, a legal force and
sanction being given to certain articles in its constitution and ad-
ministration." [Italics supplied.] This is so clearly an exclusive,
formal, legal arrangement between the United States government
and one church (in fact, one parish) that it obviously has no bear-
ing on equal, impartial assistance to all religions with favor to
none (as in tax exemption). It contains the common denominator
of all "establishments "-exclusiveness.
The second veto message, signed February 28. 1911, said:
"Because the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the
United States for the use of said Baptist Church comprises a
princinle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the
United States for the use and support of religious societies. von-
trary to the article of the Constitution which declares tht 'Con-
gress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.'" 2[Italics supplied; note misquotation of First Amendment.] Clear-
lv this also concerns a particular church (a specific oarish or
church organization). As such it is an exclusive favor of govern-
ment. not an impartial aid to all religions equally. Nor is it pay-
ment for services rendered as in Bradfield v. Roberts" and other
cases. This is sufficient basis for the veto. It must be admitted,
however, that the phrase "appropriation for the use and sup-
port of religious societies" is ambiguous enough to bear an in-
terpretation that could be used to bolster up the Rutledge doc-
trine.
This phrase, however, does not prove the correctness of the
Rutledge and Pfeffer statements about Madison's beliefs, for the
followinz reasons:
1. It is ambiguous. 'What sort of appropriation for "use
and support'"-a gift. or a payment for services? Madison's ad-
ministration was. pavinz out tax money for use and sunnort of
reliious societies for .,ervirce. rendered in Christianizine the In-
dians on Indian reservations with no protest from Madison.
2. Such an interpretation of the establishment clause would
be contrary to fbh records of Jefferson, Madison, and practically
all, Congressional. Pre.idential, Supreme Court, and State his-
tory-up to March 8, 1 949.
26. 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
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3. It contains (strangely, in a document signed by James
Madison) a misquotation of the first clause of the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment says "an establishment of religion,"
not "a religious establishment." It may be easy for one un-
acquainted with eighteenth century American history to assume
that "an establishment of religion" means "a religious establish-
ment," as an educational establishment or a financial establish-
ment, or any religious organization or society. But this was
demonstrably not the meaning of Madison and of the First Con-
gress, in the First Amendment.
4. It is possible (all things considered, even probable) that
Madison considered this exclusive favor to a Baptist church, be-
cause of its exclusiveness, at least a partial "establishment of re-
ligion" and may have meant just that by what he said. It is also
possible, or probable, that a clerk or secretary phrased this
message and Madison signed it without carefully checking the
language.
Madison's Detached Memoranda27 has some passages related
to the First Amendment. However, the weight to be accorded
to these passages is a bit hard to determine. The Memoranda was
apparently written some time between 1817 and 1832, and is said
by Mliss Fleet to have been "hastily jotted down . ..to be cor-
rected, expanded, and completed later." The tentative nature of
this document is well-indicated by the reference in it to the chap-
lains in Congress. Here Madison takes the position that the sys-
tem of Congressional chaplains violates the Constitution. He does
this with no indication that it represents a complete change of
mind on his part. He took the opposite position in 1789 when he
served as a member of the joint committee to plan the chaplain
system.28 Also as President from 1809 to 1817 he administered the
federal government, whose taxes were used to pay the chaplains,
with no word of objection or protest. Whatever weight is to be
given to the Detached Memoranda, that weight is in favor of two
positions: (a) Madison thought of the- First Amendment as for-
bidding "everything like an establishment of a national re-
ligion" 29 and (b) any doubt he had about the constitutionality of
the chaplain system was based on the thought that it violated
equality among the sects and not on the thought that it impar-
tially used public funds in support of religion in general. Of
course, nothing in this Memoranda has any applic ion whatever
to a possible future Constitutional restriction on the powers of the
27. FLEaT, op. cit. supra n. 18.
28. H. R. REP_. No. 124, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1854).
29. FrT, op. cit. supra n. 18 at 558.
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individual states in the realm of religion. The principal passage
on the matter of the chaplain is as follows: ,
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Con-
gress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure prin-
ciple of religious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the nega-
tive. The Constitution of the United States forbids everything
like an establishment of a national religion. The law appoint-
ing Chaplains establishes a religious worship for the national rep-
resentatives, to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by
a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of the national
taxes. Does not this involve the principle of a national estab-
lishment, applicable to a provision for a religious worship for
the Constituent as well as of the representative Body, approved
by the majority, and conducted by Ministers of religion paid by
the entire nation.
The establishment of the chaplainship to Congress is a palpable
violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles:
The tenets of the chaplains elected (by the majority) shut the
door of worship against the members whose creeds & consciences
forbid a participation in that of the majority. To say nothing
of other sects, this is the case with that of Roman Catholics &Quakers who have always had members in one or both of the
Legislative branches. Could a Catholic clergyman ever hope
to be appointed a Chaplain? To say that his religious principles
are obnoxious or that his sect is small, is to lift the evil at once
and exhibit in its naked deformity the doctrine that religious
truth is to be tested by numbers, or that the major sects have a
right to govern the minor.
D. The Total Record of the Presidency. Every President
of the United States from George Washington to Harry Truman,
including both, have throughout their administrations used fed-
'eral funds in aid of religion in "various guises, forms and de-
grees." The First Congress, under Washington and at his recom-
mendation, began using federal funds to support missionaries to
Christianize and civilize the Indians. ° This was carried on with-
out any variation until 1900, when, on account of the changed con-
ditions on the Indian reservations, not because of any constitu-
tional difficulty, the system was somewhat altered. The United
States government is still paying federal money to religious
schools for certain services which they render the Indians on the
reservations.
The First Congress, under Washington, started the chaplain
system for the United States Army,83 and the Third Congress
30. LowRIE AND CLARK, op. cit. supra n. 24.
31. 1 STAT. 223 (1791).
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adopted it for the United States Navy.2 Every President since
Washington has continued to use government funds impartially in
support of religious activities without recommending any change
in the Constitution, or any change in congressional legislation, or
issuing any countermanding orders as Commander-in-Chief of the
army and navy. I am confident that President Eisenhower will
continue to use federal funds in impartial aid of religion in vari-
ous ways.
We have never had a President who took the position which
Dr. Pfeffer is taking in this debate; and we have had among the
Presidents some men of special competence and experience in re-
gard to the meaning and application of the Constitution. Not only
Jefferson and Madison and others who might be called Founding
Fathers, but later other men of devotion and scholarship in law,
history, and government have* been Presidents; for instance, to
mention only a few, Lincoln, Garfield, Theodore Roosevelt, 'Wil-
liam Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. It apparently has
never occurred to any President that the Constitution of the
United States which he had sworn to uphold made it unconstitu-
tional for the United States government to aid religion, even im-
partially. Not one of our Presidents (if he was an honest man)
could have believed that the First Amendment created "a com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activi-
ty and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support of religion. The prohibition broadly for-
bids state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise,
form, or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious
purposes." This is the Rutledge doctrine which Dr. Pfeffer is
upholding. It makes every President in our history either ig-
norant of the First Amendment or dishonest.
E. The Total Record of Congress. The establishment clause
of the First Amendment is simply a statement that Congress shall
not make any law at all concerning "an establishment of religion."
If Dr. Pfeffer is right in his position, any federal aid to religion,
even non-preferential, constitutes an establishment of religion.
Therefore, any law by any Congress which is concerned with any
kind of government aid, even non-preferential, to religious
activity is necessarily unconstitutional. This has to be Dr.
Pfeffer's position.
If Dr. Pfeffer is right, then every Congress that has ever
sat in the history of the United States, has put unconstitutional
laws on the statute books, without effective protest from the
32. 1 STAT. 350 (1794).
33. Supra n. 20.
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opponents in Congress, without protest from the Presidents, and
without anyone successfully taking such violations of the Con-
stitution to the Supreme Court for adjudication. The only de-
cision in the history of the Supreme Court that upholds Dr.Pfeffer's position is that in the McCollum case, and that dealt
with state law, not law by Congress.
Under every Congress we have had chaplains in the House
and Senate; chaplains in the army and navy, and of course, wehave chaplains in such federal institutions as hospitals and asy-lums. The federal government spent large sums of money ap-propriated by Congress in support of Christian missionaries to
the Indians. The United States government is still using federal
funds for impartial support of religious activities.
Not only does the record of the Congress from 1789 to 1953
sweepingly repudiate the Rutledge-Pfeffer doctrine as to the
meaning of the establishment clause in laws passed, appropria-
tions made, actions approved, but the Congressional record of
disapproval of this doctrine is also clear.
Not only has Congress never put any such theory into prac-
ice, but Congress has refused some twenty times to take the first
step to allow such a policy to be explicitly expressed in the Con-
stitution.3 4 There were eleven formulations of this doctrine pre-
sented as proposed amendments in the period 1870-1888, after thepassage of the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems to be universally
agreed that, as held in Barron v. Baltimore,35 the Bill of Rights
contained restrictions only on the federal government, not on
the individual states.
The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) provided: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any Statedeprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law, nor deny to anv person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Beginning with the Slaughter
House Cases (1873)6 and continuing ever since, the SupremeCourt has held that the privileges and immunities protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment were those derived from United
States citizenship-not those of citizenship in a state.
It was not until 1925, fifty-seven years after the adoption ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, that the Supreme Court assumed
34. AMES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,1789-1889; ANuAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATON, H. R. Doc.No. 353, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 277-278 (1897).
35. 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
36. 16 WaIl. 36 (U. S. 1873).
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that the words "liberty ... without due process of law" in the
Fourteenth Amendment were a restriction on the state legisla-
tures, preventing them from invading "the fundamental personal
rights and liberties" which were "protected by the First Amend-
ment from abridgement by Congress". 37 This was clearly not a
statement that the First Amendment, or the Bill of Rights, had
been transferred by the Fourteenth Amendment (or absorbed into
it) to a position of restriction on the several states, but only that
certain basic freedoms, long protected by the First Amendment
from invasion by Congress, were now protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment from invasion by the states.
A few years later Chief Justice Hughes expressed the same
idea."8 "Since that time the Court has added freedom of religion
and freedom of assembly to the list of liberties protected by the
due process clause. Thus, by a complete judicial about-face, the
Supreme Court quietly imposed on the states at least some-of the
guarantees of civil liberty in the federal Bill of Rights. It
did this, furthermore, without disturbing Chief Justice Mar-
shall's ruling that the Bill of Rights itself does not limit state
action. [Italics mine.] Only those civil liberties, however, have
been thus read into the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment which the Court regards as fundamental . . . of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."' 9
In the relevant cases from 1925 to 1948 (the date of the
McCollum case) the First Amendment per se was not involved--
only the Fourteenth Amendment's phrase "liberty without dtie
process of law." In these cases the Court took the position that
only the "fundamental freedoms implicit in a scheme of ordered
liberty" which were covered by the word "liberty" in the Four-
teenth Amendment were involved. These cases are Stromnberg
v. California; 40 Near v. Minnesota- ;4" Hamilton v. The Univer-
sity of California;42 Palko v. Connecticut 43 Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut;4 4 Minersville School District v. Gobitis;45 Adamson v. Cali-fornia4  referring back to Palko v. Connectictt 7 and Twining
v. New Jersey. -
37. Giftlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
38. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
39. CusmAN, NEw TH F.ATs TO AmEmICAN FRoms 23-25 (Public Affairs
Committee 1948).
40. Supra n. 38.
41. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
42. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
43. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
44. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
45. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
46. Supra n. 10.
47. SuPra n. 43.
48. 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
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In the Adamson case Justice Frankfurter wrote a strong con-
curring opinion fervently endorsing the doctrine of the famous
Twininig and Palko cases. These cases repeated and emphasized
the unvarying doctrine of the Court up to that time: viz. (a)
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does
not draw all of the rights of the Federal Bill of Rights under its
protection," but that only "such provisions of the Bill of Rights
as were 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' became secure
from state interference by the clause," and (b) the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to
privileges and immunities arising from United States citizen-
ship, and not those "flowing from state citizenship." The Palko
case reaffirmed both of these doctrines, as did the Adamson case
in 1947.
In this case long and detailed argument was presented by
Justice Black asking for a reversal of the Court's position
through the long line beginning with the Slaughter House Cases
in 1873. He advocated abandoning the doctrine of the Twining
case and asked the Court "to extend to all of the people of the
nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." The Court
rejected Justice Black's argument. Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring majority opinion advocated "keeping the Twining
case intact," and opposed the idea that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was a shorthand summary of the first eight amendments."
He noted the fact that forty-three judges of the Supreme Court
had passed on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in a
period of seventy years and that of these "only one who may
respectfully be called an eccentric exception ever indicated the
belief" that the Fourteenth Amendment was such a shorthand
summary.
One year later in the McCollum case,49 the Court decided that
a program of released time for voluntary religious education, in
public school buildings in Champaign, Illinois, violated the First
Amendment because it constituted "an establishment of religion"
-which religion (Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, all of which
were participating) was established, the Court did not divulge.
The Court also did not divulge how the establishment clause of the
First Amendment became a restriction on the legislature of Illi-
nois. Obviously under the doctrine upheld by the Court for
seventy years and emphatically endorsed one year earlier after
a detailed argument asking for its discard, freedoms "arisingfrom
United States citizenship" as distinct from citizenship of the state
of Illinois, could not have been involved. Further, the Chain-
49. Supra n. 7.
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paign program violated no Illinois law, and was approved by the
trial courts, the Supreme Court of the state, the state educational
machinery, the local board of education, and the parents of all
the one hundred twenty odd children involved in the program;
and objected to by the parents of one child who was not in the
program.
Under these circumstances it is easy to understand why no
Justice was sufficiently incautious as to try to explain how such a
program violated "the fundamental freedoms implicit in a scheme
of ordered liberty." However, if one wishes to assume, in spite
of the English language, and the facts of relevant history,
biography, legal scholarship, and previous Supreme Court de-
cisions, that the McCollum case has some constitutional basis,
then one must logically assume that the Court has abandoned the
seventy year old position, so clearly endorsed the year before, and
has decided that the Fourteenth Amendment is a shorthand state-
ment of the first eight amendments.
Before thosewho maybe (or have to be) interested in Supreme
Court decisions, get accustomed to this judicial revolution, the
Court decided the case of Wolf v. Colorado (1949).50 In this
case, Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court, again took the
old, standard position that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
shorthand summary of the first eight amendments, but only pro-
tects the "freedoms implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty." He
said:
The notion that the "due process of law" guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has
been rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive con-
sideration. . . . Only the other day [in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia] the Court reaffirmed this rejection after thorough re-
examination of the scope and function of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This leaves the McCollum decision Dr. Pfeffer's only support in
all Supreme Court history, implicitly -disavowed by the Court,
one year later as it was largely explicitly abandoned in the
Zorach case.,1
F. The Record of the States. Significant in showing the total
absence of an American tradition consonant with Dr Pfeffer's
position, is the record of the states. However, the question of
whether the establishment clause in the First Amendment applies
to the several states as well as to Congress, is a question of sub-
50. 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
51. Supra n. 8.
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stantially no importance, because the states in their own consti-
tutions have, many of them in the identical language of the Fed-
eral Constitution, explicitly prohibited an establishment of re-
ligion. Further, since no one in any state apparently wants an
establishment of religion, it seems hardly worthwhile to spend
time on whether or not a state could create an establishment of
religion if it wanted to.
All the states prohibit an establishment of religion, but every
state in the union has, in various ways, given non-preferential
government aid to religion, throughout its history. It follows
necessarily that in no state has impartial aid to religion been
held to constitute "an establishment of religion." All of the
states exempt religious property and organizations from taxa-
tion. This, of course, is a tremendous, impartial government aid
to religion. The financial aid to religion is just as real as though
the government collected the money and handed it back in sub-
sidies. The difference is only one of bookkeeping, and the First
Amendment has nothing to say on the subject of bookkeeping. If
Dr. Pfeffer and his colleagues are right, every state in the union
has, in granting tax exemption to religious organizations, been
violating its own constitution as well as the Constitution of the
United States.
The National Education Association in 1946 published a
Research Bulletin,25 setting forth in considerable detail the prac-
tices of the various states (a) "in aid to sectarian schools and to
sectarianism in public schools" as reported by state superin-
tendents and (b) practices "of supervision of sectarian schools
by public school officials" as reported from the same source. All
of the items concern cooperative contacts or relations between
state government and religion in education. Most of them ob-
viously involve some use of publicly supported personnel and
facilities. Practically all of the practices here listed would beillegal if the doctrine enunciated by Justice Rutledge and Dr.
Pfeffer should become binding law on all the states in the Union.
The result of such a calamity would be complete chaos, because
then neither Congress nor any state legislature could pass any law
at all concerning religion, or a religious institution, such as a
denominational school. We would have complete anarchy in a
large part of the educational field in the United States.
The records given in the N.E.A. bulletin are, of course, not
up to date now, and are not absolutely complete because there
were no returns from the superintendents in some states. Fur-
52. The State and Sectarian Education, 24 REsEARCH BuLLETIN No. 1 (N. E. A.
1946).
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ther, I am not making a distinction between practices that are
required and practices that are permitted, since the legal ques-
tion would be the same in either case. The tables in the N.E.A.
bulletin show fourteen items of co-operation between the "spheres
of religious activity and civic authority" and the universal co-
operation of tax exemption was not included. The tables show
that all states allowed a number of these items, and that the ma-
jority of the states allowed a majority of the items.
G. The View of Legal Scholars. The outstanding scholars
in constitutional law throughout our history have consistently
treated the establishment clause simply as a way of saying that
the federal government could not grant exclusive favors to one
religion over other religions, i. e., it could not create "an estab-
lishment of religion" for the United States as a whole. I offer
three distinguished examples from three widely separated periods.
Justice Story:
The real object of the amendment was . . . to exclude all
rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national eccle-
siastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the ex-
clusive patronage of the national government. It thus cuts off
the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former
ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters
of religion, which had been tramped upon almost from the days
of the apostles to the present age.53 [Italics supplied.]
Nowhere in Story's work is there even an intimation that the pur-
pose or effect of the First Amendment was to prevent the use of
public property for non-preferential aid to religion.
Judge Thomas 1. Cooley in discussing the meaning of an
establishment of religion in state constitutions wrote as follows:
The [state] legislatures have not been left at liberty to effect
a union of Church and State, or to establish preferences by law
in favor of any one religious persuasion or mode of worship.
There is not complete religious liberty where any one sect is
favored by the State and given an advantage by law over other
sects. Whatever establishes a distinction against one class or
sect is, to the extent to which the distinction operates unfavor-
ably, a persecution. The extent of the discrimination is not
material to the principle; it is enough that it creates an inequal-
ity of right or privilege." [Italics supplied.]
Professor Edward S. Corwin writes :as "Congress may make
no law -at all respecting an establishment of religion, nor yet pro-
53. 11 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIoN OF THE UNIm STATES § 1873
(5th ed. 1833).S4. CooLEY, Co.surrtroNAL LIMITATIONS 584 (4th ed. 1878).
55. CoRwix, THE CONSTITUTIoN-WHAT IT Mw'rs TODAY 154-156 (9th ed..1947).
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hibiting the free exercise of religious belief; and it may not make
laws which abridge'" the freedom of speech or of the press "or
the rights of assembly and petition." Also, "An establishment
of religion means a state church, such as for instance existed in
Massachusetts for more than forty years after the adoption' of
the Constitution."
V
CONCLUSION
I believe that I have shown that Dr. Pfeffer s" contention, that
the First Amendment prohibits non-preferential government
assistance to religion, is denied by:
A. The meaning of the language used.
B. The words and actions of Jefferson.
C. The words and actions of Madison.
D. The official record of all Presidents of the United States.
E. The record of every Congress in our history.
F. The total record of the decisions of the Supreme Court,
the MeCollurm case alone excepted.
G. The record of all the states in the United States.
H. The outstanding legal scholars of America.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the First Amendment does
not prohibit non-preferential government assistance to religion.
